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Abstract 
The security environment in East Asia has continuously evolved, particularly concerning 
China’s maritime expansion and North Korea’s provocative behavior. Japan, with its 
military that is being limited by its pacifist Constitution, has been steadily shifting its 
defense policy to respond to its strategic environment for its past three Prime Ministers: 
Naoto Kan, Yoshihiko Noda, and Shinzo Abe. Historical enmities, military capability, as 
well as territorial disputes have increased the threats from Japan’s neighbors to Tokyo’s 
national security. Since 2010, Japan has established a National Defense Program Guideline 
(NDPG), shifted its defense strategy from the Basic Defense Force (kibanteki boei ryoko) to 
Dynamic Defense Force (doeki boei ryoko), revised its Three Principles on Arms Exports, 
created the National Security Council (NSC), the National Security Strategy (NSS), and 
the Medium Term Defense Program (MDTP), as well as reinterpreted the Article 9 of its 
pacifist Constitution. While the NSC, NSS, MDTP, and Article 9 are conducted under the 
Abe administration, the claim that the steps Abe has undertaken to be revolutionary is 
misleading, as they are in fact a continuity from his predecessors despite coming from 
opposing political backgrounds. Despite of several significant changes in its defense policy, 
Japan still abides to its Constitution and its military is still limited. 
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Introduction 
Located in the easternmost of East 
Asia, Japan is bordered by seas with other 
East Asian nations. On its western coasts, 
the Sea of Japan lies among North Korea, 
South Korea, and Japan. Furthermore, 
China lies next to Japan’s southwestern 
most islands, separated by the East China 
Sea. With historical enmities with several 
of Japan’s East Asian neighbors and 
territorial disputes, combined with 
China’s maritime expansion, and North 
Korea’s missile and nuclear threats, Japan 
has a lot to consider in its strategic 
environment. 
As of recent years, Japan seems to 
have been making bold moves in regards 
to its military and the constitution. The 
cabinet’s approval for a reinterpretation of 
its Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) in 
order to help defend foreign countries 
under the notion of self-defense has now 
given way for JSDF to fight overseas with 
its allies when they are under attack 
(Withitwinyuchon, 2016). The step has 
been met with criticism from its neighbor, 
China, whom believes that Tokyo has 
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endangered the peace in the region (BBC 
News, 2015). While it may seem bold, the 
steps taken by Tokyo, however, are 
derived from Japan’s security threats from 
its strategic environment that needs to be 
addressed to achieve its national security. 
This article discusses the shift and 
continuity of Japanese foreign policy 
related to the changes of its strategic 
environment. Most often, the defense 
policies of states in a particular region are 
influenced by the geopolitics of the region. 
The purpose of this is to achieve the best 
possible strategic environment so that 
national interests and ultimately national 
security will be attained. The significant 
interest of superpowers in a particular 
region has altered the significance of that 
region’s geopolitics not only regionally, 
but also internationally. In particular, this 
paper elaborates the Japanese defense 
policy under three different 
administrations: Naoto Kan, Yoshihiko 
Noda, and Shinzo Abe. 
Threat Perception of Japan 
As one of the nations located in 
East Asia, Japan’s wellbeing is affected by 
the region’s strategic importance. Japan’s 
geographical location is surrounded by 
the seas (Figure 1), ensuring that maritime 
security is of critical importance to Japan. 
‚Japan is surrounded by the sea, and 
has a long coastline, numerous remote 
islands and a vast Exclusive Economic 
Zone (EEZ). Japan is a maritime state 
and dependent largely on 
international trade for its supply of 
food and natural resources.‛ (Japan’s 
2014 National Defense Program 
Guideline (NDPG)) 
 
Figure 1. Map of Japan 
 
 
In its 2015 Defense White Paper 
and its 2014 National Defense Program 
Guideline (NDPG), Japan has identified 
itself as a maritime nation that depends on 
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sea transport to import resources such as 
energy and hence achieving secure sea 
lanes as much more vital for Japan’s 
survival (Ministry of Defense, Japan, 
2015). In fact, Japan’s focus on its 
maritime capability goes as far back as its 
2005 NDPG, where it has emphasized the 
need for maritime perimeter and 
strengthening its capability to deter 
threats away from its shores (Ministry of 
Defense, Japan, 2004). 
‚In considering Japan’s security, we 
have to take into account 
vulnerabilities resulting from: limited 
strategic depth; long coast lines and 
numerous small islands; and a large 
number of important facilities in 
coastal areas, in addition to frequent 
natural disasters due to Japan’s 
geological and climatic conditions, 
and the security of sea lines of 
communication which are 
indispensable to the country’s 
prosperity and growth.‛ (Japan’s 2004 
NDPG) 
The authors use various literatures 
to analyze the level of threats and how it 
affects Japan’s strategic environment. 
Particularly, both North Korea and China 
who pose significantly more dangerous 
threats to Japan as compared to other 
states in the region, bearing in mind their 
proximity. 
‚The fact that North Korea is carrying 
out nuclear testing and strengthening 
its ballistic missile capabilities is a 
significant threat to the safety of 
Japan.‛ (Japan’s 2010 Defense White 
Paper) 
The analysis on North Korea and 
China as threats perceived by Japan is 
based on the analysis of several authors. 
The authors base it on a combination of 
Barry Buzan’s, Robert O. Tilman’s, and 
Janice Gross Stein’s elements of threats 
(structural, geopolitical, socio-cultural, 
economic, and historical), as well as Ole 
Elgström’s level of threats assessment 
(specific/diffuse, immediate/remote, 
probability/severe). The threat dimension 
can be specific to an issue or diffused. It 
can also be an immediate threat to the 
national security or a remote one that is 
not as threatening. Last but not least, a 
threat dimension may be in the short-term 
(probability) or in the long-term (severe). 
As shown in Table 1, North Korea 
poses a structural threat that is specific, 
immediate, and can be both in a 
probability (long-term) and severe (short-
term) under the Kim Jong-un regime to 
Japan. The geopolitical system in East 
Asia, where North Korea is an ally of 
another source of Japan’s threats, China, is 
the same as its structural dimension: 
specific, immediate, and can be both in the 
long and short-term. China is North 
Korea’s biggest trading partner, as well as 
its main source of food, arms, and energy 
(Albert and Xu, 2016). Moreover, as the 
most secluded country in the world 
(Davis and Jared Feldschreiber, 2013), 
North Korean people are highly 
homogenous and are subjected to long 
years of propaganda from their 
government (Uria, 2016). However, both 
the historical and economic dimensions 
are more to a diffused, remote, and in the 
long-term aspect of threat perception by 
Japan. Japan and North Korea have not 
had any direct war, and North Korea’s 
economy is not large enough to threaten 
Japan’s economy, considered be as one of 
the world’s worst economy especially 
since its great North Korean famine in the 
1990s (Eberstadt, 2016). 
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Table 1. North Korea as a Threat to Japan 
  Structural 
Dimension 
Geopolitical 
System 
Historical 
Dimension 
Socio-cultural 
Dimension 
Economic 
Dimension 
Specific      
Diffuse      
Immediate      
Remote      
Probability      
Severe      
 
‚China is increasing its activities in 
waters close to Japan. The lack of 
transparency of its national defense 
policies, and the military activities are 
a matter of concern for the region and 
the international community, 
including Japan, and need to be 
carefully analyzed.‛ Japan’s 2010 
Defense White Paper 
China also poses a threat to Japan’s 
national security, whose structural 
dimension is specific, immediate, and 
both probable and severe. China’s regime 
under Xi Jinping has been more assertive, 
especially in its maritime expansion 
(Matsuda, 2014) and has increased more 
pressures to Japan both through its East 
China Sea activities and its South China 
Sea ones (Dingli et al., 2016). Table 2 
below shows that in terms of geopolitical 
system, historical, and social-cultural 
dimension, China is a perceived threat to 
Japan that is specific, immediate, and both 
probable and severe. This is so as China’s 
proximity is very near to Japan, while its 
size is enormous. The historical enmity 
has shown considerably the bad blood 
between the two nations. The threat of 
Beijing is exemplified with the rapid 
economic rise of the state (Ministry of 
Defense, Japan, 2015), and has also 
become a specific, immediate, and both 
long-term and short-term. 
 
Tabel 2. Japan's Threat Perception to China 
  Structural 
Dimension 
Geopolitical 
System 
Historical 
Dimension 
Socio-cultural 
Dimension 
Economic 
Dimension 
Specific      
Diffuse      
Immediate      
Remote      
Probability      
Severe      
 
As such, bearing in mind that 
Japan is surrounded by seas, and its 
location in East Asia is in proximity to 
both North Korea and China that are seen 
as threats to its national security as 
mentioned in Japan’s 2014 and 2015 
Defense White Papers respectively, the 
strategic environment of Japan is of the 
utmost importance to preserve Tokyo’s 
position and stability. Identifying itself as 
a maritime nation (Ministry of Defense, 
Japan, 2015), its maritime and naval 
prowess is at the front of its focus, 
especially considering China’s expansion 
of its open seas activities. 
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The vulnerabilities of Japan’s 
security, combined with threats perceived 
from its East Asian neighbors, have 
contributed to the need to reassess Japan’s 
defense strategy and doctrine. 
Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF): An 
Overview 
Japan’s military force is a 
conundrum; despite of its status as the 
military of the state, it relinquishes its 
right to wage wars and the use of force or 
threat of force in ‘settling international 
disputes’ as means since the end of World 
War II which then puts Japan’s military as 
‘abnormal’ in statehood (Hagstro  m and 
Gustafsson, 2015), despite of the reform of 
Article 9 that now enables Tokyo to assist 
of its allies under attack (Fackler & 
Sanger, 2014). As such, its military force 
focused on self-defense and is known as 
Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF). 
Established after World War II 
(Gady, 2015), and despite of its heavy 
limitation, the JSDF is the world’s sixth 
best-equipped troops (Fitzpatrick, 2013). 
The JSDF is comprised of its Ground Self-
Defense Force (GSDF), Maritime Self-
Defense Force (MSDF), and Air Self-
Defense Force (ASDF). Their operations 
are not limited to each branch specialty, 
but rather can also be done in joint 
operations (Ministry of Defense, Japan, 
2015), which will be explained further in 
Section …. 
The GSDF is comprised of multiple 
divisions and brigades, directly controlled 
units with five regional Armies in charge 
of the defense of their respective regions. 
Its divisions and brigades are made of 
combat and logistic support units. It also 
has its Central Readiness Force consisting 
of helicopter and airborne brigades, the 
Central Readiness Regiment, the Central 
Nuclear, Biological, Or Chemical (NBC) 
Weapon Defense Unit, and the Special 
Operation Group (Ministry of Defense, 
Japan, 2015). 
The MSDF consists of the Self-
Defense Fleet with several main units 
such as the Fleet Air Force, the Fleet 
Escort Force, and the Fleet Submarine 
Force. They are responsible in defensing 
the sea areas surrounding Japan through 
its mobile operations (Ministry of Defense, 
Japan, 2015). The MSDF also has regional 
district forces that mainly protect their 
territories as well as support the Self-
Defense Fleet. 
Meanwhile, the ASDF has the Air 
Defense Command consisting of three air 
defense forces as well as a Southwestern 
Composite Air Division. They are tasked 
for general air defense tasks (Ministry of 
Defense, Japan, 2015). The ASDF also has 
its Air Defense Force made of several key 
units such as air wings, Air Defense 
Missile Groups, and the Aircraft Control 
and Warning Wing. 
Japan under the Democratic 
Party of Japan (2010-2012) 
The two Prime Ministers prior to 
Shinzo Abe were from the Democratic 
Party of Japan (DPJ), and were the 
precursors to Japan’s military reforms. 
With mounting tensions and a 
deteriorating security environment in the 
East China Sea, the then Prime Minister of 
Japan, Naoto Kan, and his administration 
released a new defense guideline called 
the National Defense Program Guidelines 
(NDPG) (Berkofsky, 2012). His successor, 
Yoshihiko Noda, further expanded the 
reform by approving the Three Principles 
on Arms Exports. 
The DPJ is the leading opposition 
of Japan’s current Prime Minister Shinzo 
Abe’s party, the Liberal Democratic Party 
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of Japan (LDP) (Liff, 2015). However, the 
course of actions done by the two Prime 
Ministers from the DPJ prior to Abe’s 
administration was reflective of the 
increasingly important need for Japan to 
defend itself from the changing strategic 
environment. In particular, the need came 
from North Korea’s ballistic missiles and 
nuclear threat, as well as China’s maritime 
ambitions and expansions. In fact, Japan’s 
defense posture trend that predated Abe’s 
return as the prime minister in 2012 was 
centered on reforms of security-related 
institutions, and steady expansion of the 
geographical and substantive scope of the 
JSDF’s operations (Liff, 2015). The DPJ 
initiated Japan’s most significant reforms 
that continue until Abe’s administration 
today. 
 
Figure 2. Timeline of Japan's Prime Ministers from 2010 to Present 
 
 
2010 National Defense Program 
Guidelines – Naoto Kan 
The 2010 National Defense 
Program Guideline (NDPG) was adopted 
by Tokyo in December 2010 under the 
Naoto Kan’s administration. It outlines 
Japan’s ten-year defense strategy to 
restructure and relocate Japan’s armed 
forces (Berkofsky, 2012) and has mapped 
out a significant changes in the Japanese 
defense policy, decision-making process, 
and force structure (Fouse, 2011). The 2010 
NDPG is the fourth Defense Program 
Guidelines in the postwar era after the 
first three released in 1976, 1995, and 2004 
(Fouse, 2011). 
In particular, the 2010 NDPG 
focuses on increasing the capability of 
JDSF and equipping them to be able to 
react to any crisis situations going past the 
defense of Japanese territory on the 
Japanese mainland, and developing 
Japan’s intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR) prowess in its 
southern islands to address its security 
challenges: North Korea’s destabilizing 
influence and China’s maritime ambitions 
and expansion. 
‚China is stepping up and expanding 
maritime activities in the region’s 
surrounding waters, and these 
activities, coupled with the lack of 
transparency shrouding China’s 
military and security aims are of 
concern to the regional and global 
community.‛ (Japan’s 2010 NDPG) 
Seeing China as a threat, the 2010 
NDPG also outlines the relocation of JSDF 
troops and defense capabilities from north 
of Japan to its south, which includes its 
southern island chains closest to China 
and Taiwan (Berkofsky, 2012). 
At the same time, the NDPG 
highlights Japan’s conceptual shift of its 
defense strategy from its Basic Defense 
Force (kibanteki boei ryoko) that was in 
place prior to the 2010 NDPG to Dynamic 
Defense Force (doeki boei ryoko) (Fouse, 
Naoto Kan (DPJ) 
•January 2010 - 
September 2011 
Yoshihiko Noda 
(DPJ) 
•September 2011 
- December 
2012 
Shinzo Abe 
(LDP) 
•December 2012 
- present 
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2011). The shift to Dynamic Defense Force 
that is highly mobile (Liff, 2015) enabled 
Japan to react accordingly to its perceived 
security needs, instead of just maintaining 
its minimum defense capacity. Moreover, 
to highlight Japan’s focus on the 
maritime/navy, it substantially reduced 
the amount of tanks and heavy artillery 
and increased its number of submarines 
and Aegis destroyers (Fouse, 2011). 
Three Principles on Arms Exports – 
Yoshihiko Noda 
After three months in office, Prime 
Minister Yoshihiko Noda lifted a forty-
year self-imposed ban on Japan’s weapon 
shipments that barred Japanese arms 
manufacturers from joint development 
and export of military technology 
(Dawson, 2011) by relaxing its Three 
Principles on Arms Exports. The move 
aimed to reduce costs for developing and 
manufacturing advanced technology such 
as jet fighters and ballistic-missile defense. 
The Three Principles on Arms Exports 
were to abstain from arms exports and 
was mapped out in three principles to 
prevent exporting to 1) communist 
nations, 2) countries subject to a United 
Nations (UN) resolution or arms embargo, 
and 3) countries involved in armed 
conflict or in the midst of entering armed 
conflict (Wallace, 2012), and to further 
strengthen Japan’s image of a pacifist state 
(Dawson, 2011) prior to the decision to lift 
the ban. 
The reinterpretation of the Three 
Principles on Arms Exports ensured a 
more lenient approach as compared of the 
version prior to this revision that is 
reminiscent of the 1967 one. In order to 
reassert Japan’s pacifist sentiment 
domestically and internationally, it further 
limited the 1967 Principles on Arms 
Exports in 1976 to include all types of 
military technology to all countries unless 
there is an exceptional reason to do so 
(Wallace, 2012). The only exception to this 
was the United States (U.S.), or ‘individual 
exemptions’ particularly during the Cold 
War period in 1983. Another exception 
was the 2004 Ballistic Missile Defense 
(BMD) weapons and non-BMD weapons 
produced by co-development and co-
production between the two states that 
could be exported to the U.S. 
Although several exceptions have 
been done in the past, however, the new 
Three Principles on Arms Exports has 
now ‘institutionalize*d]’ arms exports in a 
comprehensive manner (Dawson, 2011). 
Even though the ban has long been 
considered to be reinterpreted even before 
Noda’s term in office, the move has not 
been green-lit until under his 
administration. 
The Three Principles on Arms 
Exports has been reinterpreted under 
Yoshihiko Noda’s administration to 
facilitate more collaboration in developing 
and producing weapons for international 
trade under the notion of humanitarian 
and peaceful purposes (Reuters, 2014). At 
the same, it also enabled Japan to achieve 
an indigenous production and 
procurement of its military that is state-of-
the-art and avoided being too costly to 
strain Japan’s defense budget, especially 
with Japan’s fiscal conditions (Ministry of 
Defense, Japan, 2004). The 2011 easing of 
the arms exports law allowed Japan to 
also take part in joint development 
projects on arms, as well as supplying 
equipment for humanitarian purposes 
(Harlan, 2011). 
Japan under the Liberal Democratic 
Party of Japan (2012-present) 
Shinzo Abe, as part of the LDP, 
was elected for the second time on 
December 2012 as Japan’s prime minister 
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and has since then built on and 
accelerated Japan’s defense reforms (Liff, 
2015). Within a year of his administration, 
Abe started three major pillars of the 
current Japanese security policy: Japan’s 
first-ever National Security Council 
(NSC), far-reaching National Security 
Strategy (NSS), and the revised NDPG. 
Although the steps Abe has undertaken 
seems to be revolutionary – from pacifist-
centered ideology to proactive pacifism – 
what he has done are based upon his two 
DPJ predecessors, Naoto Kan and 
Yoshihiko Noda’s acceleration of Japan’s 
defense policy reforms. Moreover, the 
security threats faced by his predecessors 
have not dwindled, but rather, elevated to 
a new level. ‘The Gray Zone’ 
contingencies initially mentioned in 
Japan’s 2010 NDPG are situations that are 
not peacetime but which remain below the 
threshold of armed attack. This term has 
become pivotal to major documents under 
Abe’s administration (Liff, 2015). 
‚There are ongoing regional conflicts 
involving various countries as well as 
an increase in the number of so-called 
‚gray-zone‛ situation, that is, neither 
pure peacetime nor contingencies over 
territory, sovereignty and maritime 
economic interests. 
‚… North Korea has also repeatedly 
heightened tension in the region by 
conducting military provocations in 
the Korean Peninsula and by 
escalating its provocative rhetoric and 
behavior against Japan and other 
countries. 
‚… China is rapidly expanding and 
intensifying its activities in the 
maritime and aerial domains in the 
region including the East China Sea 
and the South China Sea… and has 
intruded into Japanese territorial 
waters frequently and violated Japan’s 
airspace…‛ (Japan’s 2014 NDPG) 
As such, there is a continuity from 
Abe’s two DPJ predecessors that has now 
become the foundation to his 
administration’s defense policy. However, 
at the same time, Abe’s establishment of 
new institutions such as the NSC and NSS 
as well as the recent reinterpretation of 
Japan’s military law are bold steps that 
reflect Japan’s steps towards military 
normalization process (Spitzer, 2016). 
Japan’s declaration as a maritime state 
(Ministry of Defense, Japan, 2015) and the 
rapid expansion and advancement of 
China’s high seas operations further 
accentuate Tokyo’s direction on its 
defense policy that is centered on its 
maritime and naval operations through its 
‘Proactive Contribution to Peace’ 
(Ministry of Defense, Japan, 2014). 
National Security Strategy (NSS) 
The NSS was the first for Japan in 
terms of policy concerning national 
security focusing on foreign affairs and 
defense policy. It outlines which 
approaches Japan should take according 
to the long-term outlook of its national 
interests. The NSS replaced the ‘Basic 
Policy on National Defense’ that Japan 
used as a foundation for its defense policy 
prior. In turn, the NSS was used as the 
basis for the NDPG and both are designed 
for the next decade.  The NDPG was 
devised for a medium to long-term 
outlook and the Medium Term Defense 
Program (MDTP) highlights the budget 
limit and the total of defense equipment 
acquisition in the next five-year period to 
accomplish the defense posture and 
capability as has outlined in the NDPG. 
Japan’s NSC along with other basic 
foreign and defense policies regarding 
Japan’s national security create the NDPG. 
The NSC was established on November 
2013 based on the ‘Act of Partial Revision 
of the Establishment of the Security 
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Council.’ The NSS, NDPG, and MTDP 
then become the foundation to determine 
Japan’s annual budget and appropriate it 
based on relevant situations, as outlined 
in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Relations Among NSS, NDPG, MTDP, and Annual Budget 
 
 
Japan’s NSS is constructed on the 
principle of ‘Proactive Contribution to 
Peace based on the Principle of 
International Cooperation’ as its base, 
outlined in the 2015 Defense White Paper, 
in which Tokyo reasserts itself as a major 
player in international politics and as a 
peace-loving nation to seek of its own 
security and peace and security in the 
Asia-Pacific region. Japan also believes 
itself as ‘a proactive contributor to peace’ 
through the basic principle of 
international cooperation, and thus will 
provide ‚more than ever before to peace, 
security and prosperity of the 
international community‛ (Ministry of 
Defense, Japan, 2014). 
The NSS is also based on Japan’s 
national security objectives and national 
interests. In particular, Japan clearly states 
its national interests in the 2015 Defense 
White Paper (Ministry of Defense, Japan, 
2015) as follow: 
 ‚To maintain its sovereignty 
and independence; to defend 
its territorial integrity, to 
ensure the safety of life, person 
and properties of its nationals, 
and to ensure its survival while 
maintaining its own peace and 
security grounded in freedom 
and democracy and preserving 
its rich culture and tradition; 
 To achieve the prosperity of 
Japan and its nationals through 
economic development, 
thereby consolidating its peace 
and security; and 
 To maintain and protect 
international order based on 
rules and universal values, 
such as freedom, democracy, 
respect for human rights, and 
the rule of law.‛ 
Furthermore, Japan also highlights 
its national security objectives to achieve 
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its national interests (Ministry of Defense, 
Japan, 2015) as follow: 
 ‚Strengthen the deterrence 
necessary for maintaining 
Japan’s peace and security and 
for ensuring its survival, thus 
deterring threats from directly 
reaching Japan, and defeating 
such threats and minimizing 
damage if by chance such 
threats should reach Japan. 
 Improve the security 
environment of the Asia-Pacific 
region and prevent the 
emergence of and reduce direct 
threats to Japan, through 
strengthening the Japan, U.S. 
Alliance, enhancing the trust 
and cooperative relationships 
between Japan and its partners 
within and outside the Asia 
Pacific region, and promoting 
practical security cooperation.  
 Improve the global security 
environment and build a 
peaceful, stable and 
prosperous international 
community by strengthening 
the international order based 
on universal values and rules, 
and by playing a leading role 
in the settlement of disputes.‛ 
Tokyo has also outlined its NSS 
into six main points (Ministry of Defense, 
Japan, 2015) as follow: 
1. Solidification and Expanding 
Japan’s Capabilities and Positions, 
2. Strengthening the Japan-U.S. 
Alliance, 
3. Reinforcement of Diplomacy and 
Security Collaboration with 
Japan’s Allies for Peace and 
Stability in the Global Stage, 
4. Proactive Contribution to Global 
Efforts for Peace and Stability of 
the Global Stage, 
5. Increasing Collaboration 
According to the Universal Values 
to Settle International Issues, 
6. Consolidation of the Domestic 
Basis that Provisions National 
Security and Endorsing Domestic 
and International Understanding 
Japan acknowledges the 
importance of the security environment 
surrounding Japan as its national security 
challenge. With the U.S.’s focus shifting 
on the Asia-Pacific region, the balance of 
power is also altered. Nation-states 
possessing large-scale military force and 
in possession of nuclear weapons, such as 
China and North Korea, are considered as 
challenges to Japan’s national security. 
Japan’s 2015 Defense White Paper further 
mentions on the ‘gray-zone’ situations 
with North Korea and China. 
Japan’s National Defense Program 
Guidelines 
Similar with the 2010 NDPG under 
Naoto Kan, Shinzo Abe’s administration 
emphasizes and expands upon ‘the 
Dynamic Joint Defense Force’ as the center 
for Japan’s peace and security. Focusing 
on ISR activities, as well as improving 
Japan’s deterrence and response 
capability, Tokyo pursues more on joint 
operations, improving its equipment and 
hire in handling activities, and developing 
defense proficiencies in terms of its 
quality and quantity (Ministry of Defense, 
Japan, 2015). 
Compared to its predecessor, the 
2013 NDPG has increased its authorized 
number of personnel from 154,000 in 2010 
to 159,000, active duty personnel from 
147,000 in 2010 to 151,000, and reserve-
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ready personnel from 7,000 to 8,000 
(Ministry of Defense, Japan, 2015). 
The 2013 NDPG under Abe’s 
administration emphasizes on the security 
environment challenges, paying particular 
focus on North Korea and China. At the 
same time, it also reinforces Japan’s status 
as a maritime state, especially considering 
its geographical characteristics and belief 
that it needs to address several issues 
concerning security challenges and 
destabilizing ones that are more 
prominent and severe through reinforcing 
its defense architecture, and also 
promoting bilateral and multilateral 
security cooperation with other countries. 
As its long-time ally, the U.S. is viewed as 
vital to Japan’s security (Ministry of 
Defense, Japan, 2015), especially when 
needing further deterrence from the U.S. 
when it comes to nuclear weapons threats. 
In responding to Japan’s security 
environment challenges, it believes the 
role of is the JSDF is vital to deter and 
response to various situation (Ministry of 
Defense, Japan, 2015). An emphasis on the 
sea and airspace surrounding Japan is of 
the utmost importance, followed by 
responding to attacks on remote islands, 
as well as ballistic missile ones, as 
outlined in Japan’s 2015 Defense White 
Paper. The emphasis on the seas 
surrounding Japan calls for a maritime 
supremacy as well as air superiority. 
Moreover, to respond to ballistic missile 
capability of North Korea, Japan 
specifically mentions its commitment to 
enhance its readiness, sustainable 
response, and simultaneous engagement 
capability (Ministry of Defense, Japan, 
2015). 
Although putting the term 
‘maritime supremacy’ in its 2015 Defense 
White Paper, Japan uses a combination of 
both maritime and naval forces to defend 
its surrounding focus. As maritime and 
naval supremacy is one of Tokyo’s focus 
in 2013 NDPG (Ministry of Defense, 
Japan, 2015), the MSDF also undergoes 
significant changes in terms of its quality 
and quantity. The MSDF will have an 
increased number of destroyers to 54 new 
destroyers that have the capability to 
detect submarines and minesweeping 
underwater vehicles (Ministry of Defense, 
Japan, 2015) (Figure 4) to enhance Japan’s 
response capabilities in patrols and to 
defending Japan’s surrounding waters. 
Moreover, the MSDF architecture is also 
enhanced to be able to increase its 
capability in information gathering as well 
as surveillance and warning activities. As 
such, Japan has increased another Escort 
Division in its Omura based in the 
southwestern territory of Japan – close to 
China and North Korea. The majority of 
the MSDF are also concentrated in the 
south of Japan such as in Kure, 
Komatsushima, Omura, Sasebo, Kanoha, 
and Naha. 
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Figure 4. Japan's New Destroyer and Plans to Increase in 10 Years 
 
Source: Ministry of Defense, Japan, 2015 
 
Japan also emphasizes its joint 
operations as part of the Dynamic Joint 
Defense Force and plans to move its ASDF 
fighter aircraft units, air warning and 
control units, as well as air 
refueling/transport units deployment 
from the northern part of Japan to its 
southwestern territory (Figure 3). The 
establishment of a new 13th squadron and 
the increased number of squadron stations 
in Naha to two are also located at south of 
Japan. One squadron is added to each air 
warning and control units as well as air 
refueling/transport units (Ministry of 
Defense, Japan, 2015). 
 
Figure 5. Changes in Major Units of the ASDF 
 
Source: Ministry of Defense, Japan, 2015 
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Medium-Term Defense Program 
Created based on the NDPG, the 
MTDP is comprised of six programs to 
achieve the targeted number of defense 
buildup. The programs are in line with the 
aforementioned NDPG (Ministry of 
Defense, Japan, 2015) as follow: 
1. Emphasize on ISR, intelligence 
capabilities, response to ballistic 
missile attacks, and attacks on 
remote islands; 
2. Prioritize development of 
capabilities to achieve maritime 
and air supremacy, rapid 
deployment, preparations for 
invasions; 
3. Efficiently secure defense 
proficiencies in quality and 
quantity; 
4. Endorse processes to restructuring 
its personnel management system; 
5. Strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance 
to achieve greater deterrence and 
response capabilities; 
6. Obtain greater efficiencies and 
streamline the defense forces’ 
buildup. 
The MTDP, most importantly, 
highlights the reorganization of JSDF 
units, with the GSDF having the largest 
reform since its establishment. To be able 
to achieve better cooperation in its joint 
operations amongst units, the GSDF 
established a Ground Central Command 
(GCC) and a coast observation unit and 
area security units to better respond to 
any attacks on Japan’s remote islands, 
particularly in its southwest region 
(Ministry of Defense, Japan, 2015). 
The plan of relocation of the GSDF 
since 2010 from northern part of Japan to 
its southern and southwestern territory is 
devised to better defend Japan’s territorial 
waters and its surrounding seas as part of 
its Dynamic Joint Defense Force against 
incoming security threats, particularly 
from Japan’s neighbors. The new coast 
observation unit in Yonaguni and area 
security unit under the GSDF, as well as 
its ‘Amphibious Rapid Deployment 
Brigade’ (Ministry of Defense, Japan, 
2015), are part of Japan’s strategy to 
defend its territory from incoming attacks 
that is largely defensive in nature. 
Revised ‘Three Principles on Arms 
Exports’ 
Following the move by his 
predecessor, Yoshihiko Noda, Shinzo 
Abe’s government further relaxed the 
‘Three Principles of Arms Exports’ on 
March 2014 and renamed it as ‘Three 
Principles on Defense Equipment 
Transfers.’ The new rules allow for 
transferring defense-related equipment to 
foreign governments and to international 
institutions as long as it is to ‘contribute to 
peace and be helpful for the active 
promotion of international cooperation’ 
and ‘Japan’s national security’ (Takashi, 
2014). 
Despite the revision under Abe’s 
administration, however, the re-entry of 
Japan into the international arms market 
still faces several setbacks. Its joint arms 
development plan with Turkey in 2014 
failed just three months after the revision 
under Abe due to concerns of usage of 
Japanese arms to conflict-ridden states. At 
the same time, domestically, the new 
Three Principles on Arms Exports also 
face scrutiny and criticisms (Knowler, 
2016) in light of its failed deals. Successful 
submarine deal with Australia would 
have strengthened Abe’s bid for Japan’s 
new proactive pacifism, that is, to also 
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establish or expand Japan’s military 
industry technological coordination and 
integration with its allies (Harner, 2014). 
Yet, the deal failed, and the failure was 
credited to the lack of apt strategy by the 
government (Knowler, 2016) and the 
industry that signifies Japan still has more 
to tackle before it is able to enter the 
international arms market as a fully-
fledged player (Sentaku Magazine, 2016). 
Japan’s Overseas Military Operations 
The Japanese military currently 
functions as a self-defense force to Japan 
and is unable to conduct campaigns 
overseas outside of the notion of self-
defense according to its constitution. 
However, Japan’s reinterpretation of its 
pacifist Constitution is reflective of a more 
offensive move of a defensive purpose. 
Japan reinterpreted its pacifist 
Constitution, allowing the JSDF to combat 
on foreign soil for the first time since its 
pacifist Constitution was established after 
World War II (McCurry, 2016). The 
security law is the reinterpretation of 
Article 9 of the Constitution (Ford, 2015) 
that also enables Tokyo to aid its allies in 
overseas conflicts under the term of 
collective self-defense. The move by the 
Japanese parliament is said as the biggest 
shift in Japan’s defense policy since World 
War II (McCurry, 2016). The 
reinterpretation itself was motivated by 
the changing security environment of 
Japan, especially with North Korea’s 
nuclear and ballistic missiles, as well as 
Chinese naval activities in the Japanese 
surrounding waters (Fackler and Sanger, 
2014). 
After the reinterpretation, Japan 
has been able to use force in the event of 
an attack on a foreign country that would 
also indirectly threaten Japan’s survival 
(Figure 6 and 7). The scope is no longer 
limited to only an attack on Japan and the 
United States, but also other Japanese 
allies (Figure 7). 
The reinterpretation of the 
Japanese pacifist Constitution, especially 
in terms of the allowance of its military to 
now conduct overseas operation under 
the self-defense term, seems to imply 
Japan’s plan to extend its defense to the 
nearby South China Sea, if there is an 
escalation of conflict. More is at stake 
when it involves the Spratly Islands, 
especially when one of the key threats 
perceived by Japan, China, is heavily 
involved in the South China Sea dispute 
(Dingli et al., 2016) where it is the gateway 
to the East Asian region. 
Military Modernization 
In lieu of Japan’s military focus 
change from its Basic Defense Force 
(kibanteki boei ryoko) that was in place prior 
to the 2010 NDPG to Dynamic Defense 
Force (doeki boei ryoko) (Fouse, 2011), 
Tokyo has continuously modernized its 
military to better equip the Dynamic 
Defense Force. Japan is considered as one 
of the most powerful military forces in the 
globe today (Mapp, 2014). In particular, its 
MSDF and ASDF are armed with state-of-
the-art aircrafts and ships (Mapp, 2014). 
The Japanese Ministry of Defense 
(MOD) has plan to convert its GSDF to be 
mobile and can be transferred to the East 
China Sea quickly when crisis occurs by 
2023 (Gady, 2015). At the same time, the 
2016/2017 shopping list for the JSDF 
includes amphibious assault vehicles, as 
well as tanker aircraft, Aegis destroyers, 
and mobile missile batteries. 
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Figure 6. Reinterpretation of Japanese Legislations 
 
Source: Ministry of Defense, Japan, 2015 
Figure 7. Reinterpretation of Armed Attack Situations Response Act 
 
Source: Ministry of Defense, Japan, 2015 
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On April 2013, the Japanese 
Cabinet approved the Basic Plan on Ocean 
Policy – an initiative to ensure security of 
the oceans through:  
‚reinforcement of the wide-range 
routine system of surveillance, 
systematic improvement of warships, 
aircraft and other vehicles, 
strengthening of the system of 
collaboration between the SDF and 
Japan Coast Guard, and development 
of a system of collaboration to ensure 
order and safety on the coasts and 
isolated islands.‛ (Japan’s 2015 
Defense White Paper) 
Japan has also increased its 
defense budget and military spending as 
of recent years. Japan has increased its 
military expenditure in 2015 (Table 3), 
which further highlights and increases 
threats from North Korea and China 
(SIPRI, 2016). Furthermore, in August 
2016, Abe’s administration has further 
requested for another increase in 
spending for the JSDF, particularly to 
expand Tokyo’s missile defenses (Rich, 
2016). 
 
Table 3. Japan’s Defense Budget Comparison, 2014 and 2015 
 
Source: Ministry of Defense, Japan, 2015 
 
The new proposal is budgeted at 
$50.2 billion, another increase of Japan’s 
military spending for the past five years 
(Gady, 2015). The new proposal is also a 
2.3 per cent increase in budget as 
compared to the year prior (Rich, 2016). 
As shown in Table 3, there is quite a 
significant increase from fiscal year 2014 
to 2015. The increase in Japan’s defense 
budget is expected to create more 
amphibious warfare capabilities, as well 
as a lighter Dynamic Joint JSDF (Ministry 
of Defense, Japan, 2015). 
As shown in Figure 8, Japan has 
increased its procurements on tanks, 
vessels, as well as aircrafts. The MOD has 
increased the number of all three military 
vehicles in response to the growing 
security risks in Japan’s regional 
environment. 
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Figure 8. Current Status of the Unit Price and Acquisition Quantity of Defense 
Equipment 
 
Source: Ministry of Defense, Japan, 2015 
 
The MSDF are equipped with 50 
modern guided missile destroyers, as well 
as the general-purpose frigates on par 
with the U.S. Navy. These sophisticated 
guided missile destroyers have the 
capability of anti-ballistic missile. Figure 8 
has also shown Tokyo’s plan to continue 
to increase its destroyers for the next ten 
years. A large helicopter carrier, dubbed 
as a destroyer by the Japanese, was 
launched in August 2013 by the MSDF to 
be able to better project its power. 
Moreover, the ASDF is also 
equipped with over 300 fourth-generation 
combat aircraft, and is planned to further 
purchase the F-35 multirole aircrafts. The 
F-35 multirole aircrafts are connected into 
a state-of-the-art command and control 
system network that also includes the 
Airborne Warning and Control System 
(AWACs) aircrafts. Furthermore, Japan 
has also been extensively constructing its 
anti-aircraft missile system that would 
also have the anti-ballistic missile 
proficiency according to the PAC-3 
missile. Table 4 below shows other plans 
for Japan’s acquisition of new state-of-the-
art aircrafts, naval vessels, and other 
military equipment. 
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Table 4. Japan's Plans for Its Military Modernization 
 
Source: Ministry of Defense, Japan, 2015 
 
Japan has also focused on 
modernizing its southern and western 
hemispheres, as evidenced in Japan’s 
Interim Defense Review in July 2013 
(Mapp, 2014). Japan planned to obtain 
military capabilities best for defense, 
especially in terms of striking down 
enemy forces, missile forces in their home 
bases, increase in surveillance capability, 
amphibious forces, and brand new naval 
vessels. Moreover, the focus is on 
improving the Japanese capability in 
interception scrambles by ASDF aircraft to 
incoming Chinese aircrafts into Japan’s 
airspace. 
The focus on modernizing the 
southwestern parts of Japan has been in 
the picture since as early as 2011, under 
Prime Minister Naoto Kan and then 
followed by Yoshihiko Noda. The MTDP 
for fiscal year 2011-2015 highlights on 
restructuring Japan’s armed forces in all 
three branches where there will be 
relocation of all three to Japan’s 
southwestern parts. The ASDF’s defense 
capabilities were planned to be upgraded, 
and its F-4 fighter aircrafts were to be 
replaced with the fifth-generation ones. 
Moreover, the budget for Japan Coast 
Guard (JCG) was also increased to buy 
more ships and jets, while the navy would 
receive modern Aegis destroyers made by 
the U.S. Other planned purchases were 21 
patrol ships, seven reconnaissance jets, 
and addition of its AEGIS destroyers from 
four to six. 
Japan under the Liberal Democratic 
Party of Japan’s Shinzo Abe: 
Revolutionary Enough? 
During his visit to Washington in 
February 2013, then newly-elected 
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe 
proclaimed that ‚Japan is back‛ (Sakaki, 
2015). As a right-wing nationalist, Abe 
had been criticized for attempting to move 
away from the traditional aspects of 
Japanese security policy (Sakaki, 2015) to 
proactive pacifism. The introduction of a 
NSC and SCC, the relaxation of the ‘Three 
Principles of Arms Exports,’ and the 
reinterpretation of Japan’s constitution on 
its JSDF have given more concerns to its 
East Asian neighbors (Sakaki, 2015). 
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At the first glance, Abe’s 
administration seems to be radical in 
shifting Japan’s direction from a pacifist 
country to proactive pacifism. Various 
documents under the Abe administration 
have continuously used the term of 
‘Proactive Contribution to Peace,’ namely 
the 2014 NDPG, which states that Japan 
will achieve as such by ‚proactively 
securing peace, stability and prosperity of 
the international community while 
achieving its own security as well as peace 
and stability in the Asia-Pacific region by 
expanding and deepening cooperative 
relationships with other countries‛ 
(Ministry of Defense, Japan, 2014). 
However, the change itself is not out of 
the ordinary when we observe the 
security environment and the geopolitics 
surrounding Japan in the past six years. 
Abe’s two predecessors, Naoto Kan and 
Yohihiko Noda of the DPJ, have built 
upon the foundations to the more 
prominent shifts done by Abe’s 
administration towards Japan’s military 
normalization process. 
 
Table 5. The Shift and Continuity of the Japanese Defense Policy 
 Naoto Kan (DPJ) Yoshihiko Noda (DPJ) Shinzo Abe (LDP) 
NDPG    
Three Principles on Arms Exports    
NSC    
MTDP    
Article 9    
 
As shown in Table 5 above, Naoto 
Kan pioneered the modified concept of 
NDPG, which altered the concept of the 
previous Basic Defense Force to Dynamic 
Defense Force. Shinzo Abe continued this 
concept in the 2014 NDPG and expanded 
it with the additions of NSC and MTDP to 
create a more comprehensive Japanese 
defense policy. Furthermore, Abe also 
further revised the initial reinterpretation 
of the Three Principles on Arms Export 
under Noda’s administration. The 
subsequent additions by Abe are 
indicative of a shift to ‘proactive pacifism.’ 
The focus on maritime and naval 
activities is reflective of Japan’s geography 
and geopolitics of the region. Both North 
Korea and China pose great threats to 
Japan’s national security. The increase in 
threat levels of its strategic environment 
has resulted in measures to counter the 
security challenges of its region since the 
era of Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda. 
Abe seeks to protect Japan’s 
national security from threats in the 
region, as well as to better increase 
Japanese influence for the nation’s 
advantage. Abe has also established a 
more substantial shift towards Japanese 
military normalization as compared to his 
predecessors, namely, the establishment 
of the NSC and the NSS, as well as the 
reinterpretation of Article 9 of the 
Constitution. As such, defense reforms 
under Abe’s administration are notable, 
but not radical and are still limited under 
its ‘self-defense’ umbrella. 
Conclusion 
Japanese defense policy is 
continuous, but also evolving: it responds 
to its strategic environment but ultimately 
still follows by its maritime focus. With 
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the rise of China and its maritime 
ambitions and expansion, as well as North 
Korea’s threats of ballistic missiles and 
nuclear arsenals, Japan has to shift its 
defense policy to protect its national 
security from external threats. 
What the last three Prime 
Ministers of Japan – Naoto Kan, Yoshihiko 
Noda, and Shinzo Abe – have done are all 
a combined effort that takes years to come 
into fruition to address Japan’s security 
issues. Ultimately, when considering 
Japan’s security environment, the course 
of actions taken by Japan is nothing out of 
the ordinary. Whilst reorganizing its 
military and reinterpreting its Article 9 of 
its pacifist Constitution, Japan still abides 
by its pacifist Constitution – its military is 
still under the context for peace and self-
defense only and are still a far cry from a 
normal military albeit being dubbed 
under a new name, the Proactive Pacifism 
under Abe’s administration. 
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